The case at The International Court of Justice (ICJ), brought by the Gambia in support of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, is one of a few parallel endeavors to hold Myanmar responsible for mass outrages committed against Rohingya Muslims, during armed force counter-insurgency operations in Northern Rakhine State in 2017.
The beginning of the hearings in the Hague on 10-12 December was engrossed particularly on Gambia’s application for so-called “provisional measures” to be urged on Myanmar. These measures are to secure the 600,000 Rohingya remaining inside Rakhine State against continuous threats whereas the merits of the broader case are being surveyed, something that’s likely to require a long time.
An idealistic appraisal of the potential of the ICJ to create a breakthrough in worldwide endeavors to reduce the Rohingya emergency rests on a few particular but commonly fortifying characteristics of the legitimate procedures are now underway.
First, Myanmar has acknowledged the specialist of the Court and decided to protect itself against the charges brought by the Gambia. The significance they join to usually underscored by the exceedingly bizarre choice by the de facto head of government, State Guide Aung San Suu Kyi, to seem in individual as the official “agent” of Myanmar. This contrasts significantly with the government’s outright rejection of the ward of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and refusal to coordinate with other UN human rights mechanisms. Although Myanmar passionately denies the affirmations of genocide, their support within the procedures at the ICJ requires them to confront their informers in open court and legitimize their activities inside the framework of worldwide law.
The potential value of this was clear as of now at the starting hearings within The Hague final week, when Aung San Suu Kyi in propelling her protection felt compelled to form several certain guarantees of dynamic government engagement with Myanmar.
Third, and very importantly, the strong focus of the ICJ is on future state conduct which opens a probability for Myanmar to be restored by taking genuine steps to fulfill its commitments beneath the Genocide Convention. The truth is that there’s a “way out” that significantly makes strides the chances that Myanmar will react helpfully to universal requests. It moreover sets up a positive connection between the Court and other parts of the UN system (and other international agencies), which can be critical accomplices in helping Myanmar to execute its obligations.
Eventually, the hope is that Myanmar can be moved to protect its interests not basically through blanket dissents of culpability, but by venturing up its endeavors to address the auxiliary causes of the Rohingya emergency. These incorporate long-standing military exemption for human rights violations, institutionalized segregation, and deep-seated inter-communal pressures. The verifiable guarantees made by the state advocate at the beginning hearings give a starting point and the court’s ruling on temporary measures can construct on this to provide a system for future remedial activity by the Myanmar state and international assistance.
