While the procedures of the ICJ could turn into a catalyst, the further activities by the Myanmar government to discuss international concerns about the treatment of the Rohingya, they also can exacerbate the condition. The Rohingya emergency is an incredibly emotive issue, and essentially an inimical and exceptionally open legal dispute could further oppose views both inside and outside the nation.
The prospect of a nationalist response inside Myanmar has expanded incredibly by the choice to accuse Aung San Suu Kyi and her government in the charges of genocide. While many ordinary Myanmar people may stay pessimist about international criticism of the military, this isn’t the case when it comes to “Mother Suu”, as the State Counselor is affectionately called. Without a doubt, many people see the case at the ICJ as an attack on the country itself and have assembled on the side of their beloved leader.
In the weeks leading up the way to the first hearings in The Hague, rallies were held over the country, at times attracting a huge number of people. The rallies were peaceful. Nevertheless, Aung San Suu Kyi has publicly called for national unity to face the international pressure and the movement has clear probably to turn hostiles to foreigners, including the Rohingya if the decisions of the court go against Myanmar.
Globally, as well, there is a risk that the procedures at the ICJ could solidify the positions. To date, official judgment and sanctions have been largely concentrated on the military. Yet, the case at the ICJ has ravaged Aung San Suu Kyi and her government of the last fig leaf of likely deniability and could further join world opinion against them. Western capitals are unmistakably hesitant to organize more extensive negative measures, for example, help blacklists, either because they comprehend that it will seal the destiny of the Rohingya or because they would prefer not to lose Myanmar to China. In any case, open weight may move them toward that path, on the off chance that not quickly, at that point over a time of years, as occurred during the 1990s.
The expanded investigation by the international community could likewise, encourage further actions by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), whose assaults on government security posts in Northern Rakhine State commenced the violence in 2017 and may well have been expected to start a bigger fire to draw international attention.
In the worst case, developing anti-foreigner sentiment inside Myanmar could merge with increasing international isolation to conquer both the political will and capacity of the Myanmar government to take the kind of measures required of it by the Genocide Convention. Further brutality in Rakhine State would just exacerbate the emergency for the Rohingya community who may have become pawns in a more extensive political game.
The method of resolving the Rohingya emergency, as most disputes, is to allow moderates on all sides that are happy to work to connect the partitions. This requires cautious technique and affability to ever-changing political realities, something a court of law is not for. The 17 appointed authorities of the ICJ can help by drawing up a provisional measures that offers a reasonable way ahead. In any case, the responsibility is on political actors, including the Myanmar government, the UN, and different states, to align their reaction to the court’s decisions to guarantee that polarization is avoided and the space for cooperation is secured, for the good of the Rohingya.
